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Asia is on the rise with increasing significance in the global economy. In parallel, 
regional cooperation and integration is becoming stronger, bringing both benefits 
and costs. The region is diverse, and so are the challenges that must be overcome 
to achieve greater trade and financial integration. For trade, with the Doha Round 
stymied, what is the best route to take in untangling the noodle bowl of FTAs?  
And how best to deepen financial integration? How does integration impact 
inequality—within and across countries? There are risks to integration. How 
should they be addressed? 
This monograph—prepared for the 2013 Asian Development Bank Annual 
Meeting—aims to stimulate debate and further research on the role regional 
integration can play in sustaining growth, reducing poverty, and promoting 
welfare and future prosperity for Asia and the Pacific.
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1Introduction
With Asia’s continuing rise and growing impact on the global economy, regional 
cooperation and integration (RCI) is expanding, bringing with it both benefits 
and costs. To sustain region-wide economic growth, an integrated market for 
the free flow of trade and investment across the region is necessary. Some degree 
of cooperation, if not coordination, in macroeconomic policy should also be 
considered.
Intraregional trade in Asia, as well as South-South trade, has grown substantially. 
But the trade landscape is becoming increasingly complicated with the 
proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). As of January 2013, the economies 
of Asia were party to 109 ratified FTAs. This has raised concerns over distortions 
associated with the so-called “spaghetti” or “noodle bowl” effect. As with trade, 
financial integration in Asia has also been expanding, though less rapidly and 
from a low base. Although this has accrued benefits in terms of consumption and 
investment risk sharing, magnitudes remain small. The majority of Asia’s savings 
continues to be intermediated outside the region. 
This monograph attempts to address some of the financial and trade aspects of 
integration in Asia. It has two self-contained sections. Section 1 focuses on the 
costs and benefits of regional integration in general, and concludes with some 
pointers specific to financial integration. Section 2 deals with trade integration 
and related policy challenges. The analysis begs many questions. Some—but not 
all—can be answered by the suggestions offered in the two sections.
1. Regional economic integration appears to have reduced income gaps 
between countries through convergence. But the evidence shows it may also 
have increased inequality within countries. It also appears that physical and 
other forms of connectivity favor some countries over others. How can this 
be fixed? How can we increase the likelihood that greater integration boosts 
the welfare for all—both within and across countries?
2. Given Asia’s vast diversity, the challenges for achieving greater trade and 
financial integration also vary. Are the challenges facing small, vulnerable, 
or resource-dependent economies very different from the others? How can 
these be addressed?
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3. Financial integration has trailed trade and physical integration. What are 
the critical barriers to promoting financial integration in Asia? To the extent 
that greater integration increases the risk of contagion, how can we better 
manage market integration to maximize benefits while minimizing costs? 
4. What does the ongoing eurozone crisis mean for the future of financial 
integration in Asia and the Pacific? 
5. What policies can reduce the risk of harmful spillover effects while continuing 
to allow countries to reap the benefits from greater financial integration? Is 
judicious use of capital controls an option? How should controls be viewed 
from a macroprudential perspective?
6. Are existing regional safety nets sufficient to help the region ride out the next 
crisis? What needs be done to further strengthen them?
7. With the impasse on a multilateral trade agreement, what is the next step? 
With the proliferation of FTAs, does the solution lie in consolidating 
multiple agreements into mega-blocs—such as the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)? Or 
should countries that have FTAs with their major trading partners look to 
harmonize and multilateralize preferences, offering them equally to smaller 
non-member trading partners to do away with the need for rules of origin?
8. A number of Asian countries are members of both the RCEP and TPP; a 
significant few are members of the RCEP but not the TPP; and a majority 
of the region is in neither. Are the RCEP and TPP likely to compete or 
complement each other?
9. A recent trend in trade agreements is the emergence of cross-regional tie-ups 
of mega-blocs—such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-
European Union (EU) and EU-United States (US) proposals. What are their 
prospects? And can these tie-ups meld together in moving toward a more 
harmonized world trading system?
10. Assuming all the current mega-bloc proposals (RCEP, TPP, EU-US, etc.) 
can be successfully and expeditiously concluded, how will this impact the 
upcoming World Trade Organization Ministerial Summit in December 2013 
and the world trade system in general?
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Regional Integration:  
Costs and Benefits 
The ongoing eurozone crisis has raised a range of questions about regional 
cooperation and integration (RCI), particularly relating to integration. This is 
healthy. There are fundamental differences between the Asian and European 
approaches to regional integration. The Asian RCI approach has been more 
bottom-up, market-driven and institution-light, with continuous efforts to 
foster strong cooperation across countries and subregions. Therefore, the 
eurozone crisis should not detract policymakers from cooperating closely, and 
there is no need for a fundamental shift in the RCI model per se. In one sense, 
the eurozone crisis has raised the importance of enhanced Asian regionalism 
even more. 
Although the crisis did not originate in Asia, its economies were hit by the 
downturn in export demand from advanced markets (the United States [US] and 
Europe), and volatility in financial markets. This simply reflects Asia’s openness. 
At present, Asian economies continue to rely on advanced markets as the 
destination for their final exports. As these economies are likely to experience a 
lengthy period of slow growth, Asia needs to continue to rebalance its sources of 
growth by strengthening domestic and regional demand. Regional cooperation 
can help support the process. 
One needs to take a balanced look at various facets of regional integration. 
Both benefits and costs should be gauged carefully in evaluating proposals for 
regional integration. The overall aim of RCI, like any development agenda, is to 
boost prosperity and reduce poverty and inequality. Small and large economies 
alike should benefit from any regional integration agenda in a sustainable and 
equitable manner.
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Benefits and Opportunities of Integration
Regional integration expands markets and input sources, better allocating 
resources across the region and accelerating economic growth.
Regional economic integration is one way countries achieve national 
interests—only in concert with others. It expands national markets to the 
region. Like globalization, it can be thought of as an alternative to international 
embeddedness—or how one relates to the rest of the world. But unlike 
globalization, regional integration is geographical, and in some cases political. It 
is stronger institutionally than globalization, as rules tend to be tighter and peer 
pressure can be more intense.
Expanding markets and input sources beyond national boundaries is one of the 
most compelling arguments for integration. With an expanded market for goods 
and services, for both output and inputs, higher economic growth and improved 
welfare can be expected (Figure 1). Integration helps more efficient resource 
allocation across the region (or globally) in line with the principle of comparative 
advantage. If, as a result, productivity growth is enhanced, regional integration 
can accelerate economic growth and increase employment. But it is important 
to realize that integration may not generate the same benefits for all. Whether in 
trade, finance, or infrastructure, integration benefits some more than others. And 
when one measures the effects in a broader sense beyond the original purpose of 
integrating, some countries can even lose (Venables 2009).1 So how the benefits 
of regional integration are distributed matters a great deal. 
Asia’s strong economic performance and resilience during the recent global 
financial crisis is testimony to the region’s openness. The slowdown of external 
demand from the US and Europe, the “traditional” market for Asia’s final goods 
exports, has been substituted by increased exports to other Asian countries, as 
well as to emerging markets outside the region. Growing production networks 
also strengthens intraregional trade. While the region continues to rely on 
the global market, the shift reflects a trend of growing regional integration, a 
process that accelerated since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Other factors 
have certainly played important roles, but the trend of increased integration and 
the continued strength of production networks clearly show how the region can 
maintain market expansion and better resource allocation across the region. 
1 Venables argued that the gains from integration are unevenly distributed. He also showed the 
conditions under which some countries will lose from integration. In particular, the effects of 
preferential liberalization in regional integration will only benefit resource-poor countries, 
whereas non-preferential liberalization tends to benefit only resource-rich countries.
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Regional integration appears to reduce income inequality between countries.
Most studies using the European experience indicate that regional integration 
coincides with a substantial decrease in income inequality between countries.2 
While economic factors are important, it is political integration that appears to 
drive the convergence. Institutional forces outweigh market forces in bringing 
national economies closer together (Beckfield 2009). Economic arguments show 
freer trade and factor mobility from integration allow less-developed members 
to grow faster than more-developed ones. Factor price equalization further 
supports the convergence hypothesis (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). In a two-
country resource-rich/resource-poor model, lowering tariffs has a negative effect 
on real wages in the resource-rich country (most gains accrue to resource rent), 
while the resource-poor country benefits through terms-of-trade (TOT). This 
also supports the convergence hypothesis. 
2 See Leonardi 1995; Armstrong 1995; Armstrong and Vickerman; and Ben-David 2001. Some, 
however, found a pattern of divergence (see Slaughter 2001; and Arestis and Paliginis 1995). Part 
of the explanation rests on the interpretation of σ- and β-convergence, where σ-convergence is 
a decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) dispersion, hence showing how the distribution of 
income evolves, and β-convergence points to a negative relationship between growth and initial 
level of GDP (see Sala-i-Martin 1996).
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Figure 1 Impact of Integration
Source: Office for Regional Economic Integration, ADB.
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An institutionalist economic explanation, however, places more emphasis on 
the formal structure and the role actors play in integration initiatives. It suggests 
that as economic actors follow common rules in a more integrated system, and 
markets increase in size and complexity, convergence will likely result. It also 
stresses the importance of politically established institutions. Thus, to analyze 
convergence, political relations matter more than regional markets or the process 
of economic development. Convergence can come from the diffusion of common 
development policies and the diffusion of common rules and market regulations.
In Asia’s case, convergence is also detected; inequality between countries has been 
declining (Figure 2). Whether this is due to regional integration or other more 
forceful factors—or both—remains to be studied. Regardless, forces explained by 
the above theoretical arguments are likely part of the reason inequality between 
countries is narrowing.
Figure 2 Gini Coefficient Indexa
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Notes: Developing Asia is Asia excluding Japan and Oceania. Data unavailable for 
Afghanistan, the Cook Islands, , Republic of the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
and Timor-Leste.
a Gini Coefficient is computed as follows:
Gini = –(n+1)n
n
n2µx
+ 2 ∑
i=1
ixi
where xi is the income of country i, μx is the average income of the population, and n is 
the total number of countries in the population. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (all 
countries have equal income) to 1 (all income held by one country).
Source: ADB calculations using data from World Development Indicators, World Bank 
and Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0 for Taipei,China.
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Risk sharing is another possible benefit of integration; unfortunately, there is 
little empirical evidence that it happens.
Intuitively, more risk sharing through integration makes sense. But many 
empirical studies show that the degree of risk sharing following integration has 
been limited. Since the work of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), there have 
been several studies examining the presence of full risk sharing using cross-
country income and consumption correlations. Most of them found that perfect 
risk sharing does not happen. Asia is no exception. Given an idiosyncratic shock, 
risk sharing in Asia was not strong, nor did it improve. 
What causes this mismatch? Based on numerous studies across many countries, 
the mismatch could come from several factors, ranging from using domestic 
equity markets as a major source of finance (French and Poterba 1991), time 
horizon and measurement errors (Canova and Ravn 1996), consumption 
endowment uncertainty (Obstfeld 1994, Mendoza 1995), and the limited size of 
capital flows and higher sovereign default (Bai and Zhang 2005).
The effect of financial integration on economic growth has been well 
documented—more so than the effect of integration on international risk 
sharing.3 Theoretically, the consumption growth rate in integrating countries will 
be cross-sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables as financial integration 
increases (Cochrane 1991). The key factor is greater insurance. If inter-regional 
or international capital markets are well integrated, countries can insure against 
idiosyncratic shocks. Individuals will invest more in high-risk and high-return 
assets if the risk can be shared or diversified (Obstfeld 1994).
In the case of Asia, financial integration remains limited; but it is increasing, 
especially after the 2008/09 global financial crisis. Using seven countries in East 
Asia for Granger-causality between growth rates in consumption, investment, 
and GDP between countries, the patterns of commonality differ between these 
variables despite evidence of common trends and factors. The results do not 
rule out the possibility that there is no causality between growth rates of those 
variables across pairs of countries. Thus, there is little evidence of an East Asian 
business cycle (with more synchronized business cycles, one might expect greater 
resilience to external shocks). There is also no consumption smoothing—the 
coefficients either have a wrong sign or are insignificant. When the period is split 
into before and after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the results are generally 
the same—no evidence of consumption smoothing, even when there is a greater 
synchronization of business cycles among countries (especially after 1997).
3  See, for example, Levine 2001. 
8 Regional Cooperation and Integration in a Changing World
In analyzing the benefits, the opportunities, the costs, and the potential risks 
of regional integration and financial arrangement, Azis (2009) concludes that 
“The degree of risk sharing in Asia has been low, in contrast to the continually 
growing regional integration especially in the trade area.” Similarly, another study 
concludes that risk sharing in Asia is low intraregionally. For a given degree of 
contagion risk exposure, the US stands out as the one that reaps the most benefit 
from sharing risks with Asia. The study suggests that the region should promote 
efforts to increase the degree of risk sharing without exposing countries to greater 
contagion risks: “pursuing these regional policy avenues should receive a priority 
over a push for further overall financial integration whose welfare effect may be 
ambiguous” (Borensztein and Prakash 2011).
All in all, while the level of Asia’s financial integration may have increased, its 
benefits in terms of consumption and investment risk sharing have been limited. 
Although the concept of integration-driven risk sharing is ideal and conceptually 
sound,4 the impact of regional integration must be predicated not on an ideal 
world, but on the world as it is.
Costs and Risks of Integration 
We hear more about the benefits of integration, especially when new regional 
cooperation initiatives are launched to strengthen integration—for example, 
positive spillover effects of infrastructure connectivity projects, initiatives to share 
risk, and better resource allocation by liberalizing markets to stimulate cross-
border flows, among others.5 Much less is heard about the risks of integration.
The cascading effect of the ongoing eurozone crisis is a vivid reminder of the 
contagion risk of highly integrated systems.
The main argument against excessive integration is that it exacerbates contagion 
in times of crisis. Examples abound of financial crises rapidly spreading from 
one country to another, especially when integration is deeper due to either 
geographical proximity or a regional arrangement.
4 Under certain circumstances, however, theoretically, risk sharing should be avoided. While greater 
regional integration can lead to better risk dispersion, risk sharing can lower expected utility when 
the standard assumption of convexity and concave utility function does not hold. In particular, this 
is true when technologies are not convex (see Stiglitz 2010). Following this dictum, and given the 
fact that things like information, externalities, and learning processes give rise to a natural set of 
non-convexities, the intuition that integration should be desirable is wrong.
5 In some cases, cooperation and integration are promoted for political reasons and to build trust. 
Even if that is the case, the political windfall that follows can also lead to significant economic 
benefits.
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While a shock may originate in the financial sector of one country, it can rapidly 
infect others across a region—affecting entire economies and damaging people’s 
welfare. For Asia, the damage caused by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis is a 
powerful reminder of the danger of contagion. An idiosyncratic shock occurring 
in Thailand leaped across boundaries, devastating other economies. And yet the 
scale of integration in Asia at the time was more limited than now, despite some 
policy convergence. One can only imagine how much worse the crisis would have 
been had intra-Asian cross-border financial holdings been larger than they were.
In light of proposals for adopting a single currency, the risks of integration cannot 
be overemphasized. Many studies prior to the formation of the euro emphasized 
the benefits and opportunities of a single currency. This could be true for Asia as 
well. But when critical preconditions are not in place, and a desirable sequence 
is not followed (for example, political before economic integration), forcing a 
single currency can be costly and risky—as seen in the ongoing eurozone crisis. 
Taking into account these costs and risks—some of which are intangible—a 
single currency remains a long-term prospect for Asia. Even after running some 
sensitivity tests, the outcome remains the same (Azis 2009). Clearly, focusing 
only on the potential benefits but neglecting the risks and costs of having a single 
currency to promote regional integration could be counterproductive.
Trade diversion is another potential risk from regional integration that can 
damage people’s welfare.
Trade diversion is another classic risk of integration debated among academics 
and policymakers alike.6 In Asia, the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is 
a notable example. Given relatively high levels of protection in the region, 
many predicted that the risk of trade-diversion would be rather high (Baysan, 
Panagariya, and Pitigala 2006). This could be minimized, however, when regional 
integration is pursued along with unilateral and multilateral liberalization (more 
on this in the next section). The trade-off between trade creation and trade 
diversion is often used to back North-South—rather than South-South—free 
trade agreements, as South-South arrangements are prone to trade diversion 
(sectors that develop have comparative advantage relative to partner countries, 
not globally). When geographical agglomeration effects are also at work, regional 
integration produces unequal net benefits; development takes place in a few 
countries rather than in all.
6 A customs union is a form of regional integration that is likely to cause the largest trade diversion 
where the effect is distributed unequally. 
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Integration tends to increase inequality within countries.
In a report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress, Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) viewed inequalities as 
the first cross-cutting challenge for quality-of-life indicators. They argued that 
inequalities should be assessed comprehensively by examining differences in 
quality of life—across people, groups and generations.
Unlike the cross-country relationship between regional integration and income 
inequality, the relationship within countries is based on the idea that market 
competition and the labor/capital balance of power is a key determinant of income 
inequality. Unfortunately, empirical studies on this are scant, with most focusing 
on European integration. These studies argue that economic integration tends 
to create a larger labor market and increase wage competition between workers 
(Western 1997). With labor exposed to competition beyond national boundaries, 
its bargaining power weakens—either through unions losing influence or by 
other means. In this case, further integration is expected to increase inequality 
internally (Alderson and Nielsen 2002).
So what is the difference between the impact of globalization and regional 
integration, as both give rise to increased market competition? Labor markets 
expand more readily and labor is more competitive within regions than between 
regions. Consequently, firms can more easily exercise control over subsidiaries 
within regions. Also, political institutions tend to be more similar within regions 
than between regions. So one can hypothesize that regional integration is likely 
to exert a larger effect on labor unions, and thus have a more pronounced effect 
on income inequality.
When integration leads to lower inequality, government intervention and the 
welfare system play a major role.
In some cases, more developed institutions (like in Western Europe) can 
insulate workers from the pressures of international competition (Cameron 
1978, Katzenstein 1985). Strong welfare states with generous unemployment 
benefits and training programs can help stabilize the national economy against 
the vicissitudes of international markets, such that worsening inequality can be 
averted when regional integration increases.
Again, most empirical evidence on this is based on Europe’s integration 
experience. The welfare state shapes stratification directly through income 
transfers—and it can reduce inequality and poverty (Western 1997, Brady 2003). 
But European integration is also associated with limitations on an individual 
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country’s government intervention, and also retrenchment of Western European 
welfare states through spending limits imposed by the “convergence criteria” of 
the 1992 Maastricht treaty (Korpi 2003). Lesser national autonomy due to regional 
integration contributes to the shrinking of the welfare state, one consequence 
being worsening income inequality. 
In Asia’s case, inequality within most countries has been widening (ADB 2012). 
This has occurred with rising economic integration. The simultaneous occurrence 
of two events does not imply causality, however. Since Asian integration is still 
limited compared with Europe, it is hard to draw any accurate conclusion on the 
link between regional integration and rising inequality within Asian countries. 
Current efforts to intensify regional cooperation to remove barriers to trade and 
finance, and to further market deregulation (“negative integration”), may produce 
forces more powerful than those caused by regulations to correct market failures 
(“positive integration”). This is evidence of this in Europe,7 and there is no reason 
why it cannot happen in Asia as well. When it does, within country inequality 
and polarization may worsen. 
Unlike in the past, it is now widely acknowledged that income and wealth 
inequality has a clear negative impact on future growth prospects. Inequality is 
associated with a host of factors (ADB 2012), but also by insecurity of property 
rights, which will lower investment. This is common knowledge. But the 
uncertainty created by the diffusion of political and social instability—caused 
by inequality—also tends to raise rent-seeking and dampens investment, all of 
which challenge the standard argument for Kuznets’ U-hypothesis.8 Thus, if 
regional integration leads to greater inequality within a country, growth and the 
prospect of improved welfare can be thrown off track.
Welfare as the Ultimate Goal
Like any policy or strategy, the goal of integration must be an improvement 
in welfare and quality-of-life—especially for the largest segment of society.
According to one Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) report, some 20 million jobs in both developed and developing countries 
7 The convergence effect of regionalization on between-country income inequality in Europe 
outweighs the polarizing effect of regionalization on within-country inequality, such that the net 
total income inequality has declined. In other words, regional integration has a positive net effect 
on reducing total income inequality. See Scharpf 1997.
8 Inequality can also affect poverty by way of determining the growth-poverty elasticity. When the 
well-known effect of growth on poverty is added, a triangular relation between growth, inequality 
and poverty is established; see Bourguignon 2004.
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have disappeared since the 2008/09 global financial crisis, and 21 million jobs 
must be generated in G20 countries just to match the pre-crisis employment rate 
(OECD and ILO 2012). The report also says this is impossible in the near term. If 
anything, there is a risk that the unemployment rate could increase. 
As integration increases the likelihood of contagion, it raises the probability 
of a crisis. The policy response is often belt-tightening. While some argue that 
this is needed to restore confidence during a crisis, they neglect to consider the 
irreversible impact of wage cuts, tax increases, benefit reductions, and reduced 
subsidies that mainly affect the most vulnerable in low-income nations. There 
are an estimated 1 billion undernourished people worldwide, 60% of whom are 
women. And close to 180 million children under five have stunted growth due to 
lack of food—exacerbated by rising prices of basic commodities resulting from 
fiscal restraints.
The policy response to a crisis caused by an integration-driven contagion can 
damage welfare, especially when governments are belt-tightening.
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that, between 2010 
and 2012, one-fourth of developing nations were excessively reducing public 
spending to below 2007 levels (Ortiz, Chai, and Cummins 2011). The study 
noted that “In the wake of the food, fuel and financial shocks, a fourth wave of 
the global economic crisis began to sweep across developing countries in 2010: 
fiscal austerity.” Indeed, despite fiscal stimulus measures to mitigate the impact 
of the global financial crisis, belt-tightening became widespread beginning 
in 2010. Based on information from 128 countries, the study found that 
governments basically relied on five ways to save cash—(i) cutting or capping 
wages (56 countries); (ii) phasing out or removing subsidies, mainly for fuel but 
also electricity and food (56 countries); (iii) rationalizing or means-testing social 
programs (34 countries); (iv) reforming pensions (28 countries); and (v) raising 
consumption taxes on basic goods (53 countries). In Asia, even without the crisis 
and austerity measures, several critical Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
will not meet their 2015 targets—such as maternal mortality rates, number of 
underweight children, and access to improved sanitation.
It is bad enough to have a crippled financial sector in a crisis, but the potential 
costs to welfare can be far worse. 
The environmental impact of a contagion-driven crisis poses another serious 
welfare risk.
While a crisis can reduce pollution and resource consumption through reduced 
economic activity, the damage to the environment is more obvious. A weakened 
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economy tends to reduce environmental priorities. Working toward a quick 
recovery, promotion of environment-degrading enterprises does more than just 
harm those living nearby. It is easy to let the environment take a back seat to 
recovery. Some pro-environment policies are also likely to be shelved or delayed 
as cost and regulatory oversight tends to weaken during a crisis.
Policymakers need to be aware that a crisis arising from contagion can have 
multiple impacts. 
The list is almost endless, but the bottom line is that, when regional integration 
raises the probability of contagion, the resulting crisis goes well beyond trade, 
finance and macroeconomics; it also affects what should be at the heart of 
all development policies and strategies: the triple bottom lines of economic 
development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability.9 The ultimate 
test of regional integration should be the extent to which it can help member 
countries to achieve these three broad goals. 
Integration and Unilateral Policies
While collective regional policies have their merit, unilateral policies can 
benefit both individual countries and the region.
While regional integration and collective regional policies have benefits, they are 
not necessarily superior to unilateral national policies. The East Asia Miracle of 
the 1980s and early 1990s is testament to the value of unilateral liberalization. To 
say that without integration, something bad will inevitably happen is wrong. To 
argue that a regional integration initiative or a regional agenda is the only way 
for an entire region to reap benefits is equally farfetched. Even without the risks 
of integration discussed earlier, this is the wrong way to think. Countries commit 
to a regional agenda because it benefits the nation, provides new opportunities, 
and allows them to allocate their own resources more efficiently. If they fail to see 
this and decide not to participate, it will not lead to disaster. This is very different 
from a global commons like addressing climate change.
If unilateral policies improve a country’s economic performance, it is not difficult 
to imagine that there will be some positive spillover effects on the regional 
economy as well. In trade and financial integration, for example, if countries 
adopt policies that are good for themselves even without signing up for a regional 
9 These are behind the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recommended by the United Nations 
to make the world adopt a new set of global goals to succeed the 15 year Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) period that will end in 2015; see Sachs 2012.
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initiative, their economic growth could become more robust and stable, which 
would also help the region.
National policies remain key for each country, but they can also play an 
important role in maintaining the integrity of domestic institutions—
important for more effective implementation of regional initiatives.
Each country has the right to protect its own regulatory arrangements and 
institutions. In view of regional integration, it is important to provide national 
or domestic policy space to maintain the integrity of domestic institutions.10 
Domestic policy space can be good for the regional economy so long as 
unilateral policy and national deliberations are based on facts and evidence for 
improving welfare. The cooperation agenda for regional integration can then 
focus on rulemaking, monitoring implementation of regional commitments, and 
minimizing negative spillovers. This approach may also improve the quality of 
national deliberations, making them more effective in improving welfare. 
Cross-border holdings of financial assets are a case in point. Cross-border capital 
flows within Asia—especially in bond markets—remain relatively small. But 
individual markets have grown significantly, providing the necessary investment 
alternatives and ways to raise long-term funds. More importantly, this can 
avoid potential maturity mismatches. And because the growing market is in 
local currency, it will also avoid currency mismatches—the “double mismatch” 
problem which played a central role in creating the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis. And that came largely from domestic national policies. While a strong 
fixed income market in individual economies is welfare-improving, it also helps 
regional bond markets and the regional economy. 
Cooperation to Manage Integration— 
The Case of Finance
Globalization and regionalization is a fact of life. Goods and services are traded 
and increasingly produced globally and regionally; labor and capital are becoming 
more mobile. It is clear that regional integration is progressing in Asia, and this 
has been strengthening further in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
But unlike Europe, Asian regional integration has been more market-driven, 
institution-lite and bottom-up. To the extent that greater integration can also 
raise the probability of contagion, there is a need to better manage the market 
process of integration to reap the benefits while minimizing potential costs. 
10 A similar principle can also be applied to the concept of globalization (see Rodrik 2011). 
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In many cases, Asia needs to cooperate more and better—in trade, finance, 
macroeconomic policy, infrastructure (including energy), and on the 
environment. In some of these areas, greater cooperation will not necessarily lead 
to greater integration. Cooperation in providing financial safety nets is a clear 
example; it can mitigate the risks of contagion-driven crises with no direct impact 
on integration. On the other hand, cooperation in infrastructure connectivity will 
almost certainly increase the cross-border flows of goods, services, and people. 
With continuing uncertainty over the global economy, any country is vulnerable 
to a contagion-driven crisis through real sector, trade and financial channels. 
Contagion through the financial channel is perhaps the most difficult to detect, 
yet its impact can be the most devastating—and affect the other two channels 
as well. While domestic macroeconomic policy can help mitigate the impact, 
sufficient foreign exchange reserves are usually the first line of defense to 
financial contagion. But a domestic safety net alone may be inadequate, even for a 
resilient Asia. If contagion effects are severe, markets may react indiscriminately. 
To the extent that an interconnected financial system raises the probability of 
spillover effects—and that the global nature of most crises calls for a coordinated 
policy response—a regional safety net can complement the domestic and global 
financial reforms needed to respond to systemic shocks. An effective financial 
safety net is thus needed. 
The urgency of preparing regional safety nets is indisputable—as the next crisis 
could be rooted in new vulnerabilities, transmitted through different channels. 
Some can or cannot be detected (contagion channels do not mirror past events). 
Even in an economy with relatively robust macroeconomic and financial systems, 
closer cooperation for an effective regional safety net is needed. A collective 
regional initiative can often collide with flagging domestic political will. A fully-
functioning regional financial safety net—supported by an effective surveillance 
system—can help member countries minimize the risk of contagion (Azis 2012; 
and Kawai, Morgan, and Takagi 2012).
Countries in Asia have made impressive progress in regional economic integration 
and cooperation. ADB has helped and continues to help facilitate this process. 
The region’s diversity, development pattern and global links have generated a 
unique Asian model of regionalism—dynamic, open, multi-track, and multi-
speed—which enhances prosperity not only in the region, but also in the rest of 
the world. Asia’s open regionalism underscores the importance of strengthening 
trade, investment, and capital flows within the region while maintaining strong 
ties with, and remaining open to, the rest of the world. It aims to build a regionally 
integrated and globally connected Asia.
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Section 2
Trade Integration  
and Policy Challenges
Asia is a relative latecomer to free trade agreements (FTAs); but over the past 
decade, the number of FTAs involving at least one country from the region 
has increased dramatically—creating the so-called “Asian noodle bowl.”11 The 
proliferation has been greatest in Asia, a process accelerated by the global 
multilateral trade impasse.
By January 2013, ratified FTAs had more than tripled since 2002—to 109 from 36. 
There are another 148 FTAs at various stages of development, bringing the total 
to 257. Today, global FTA activity involves Asia more than any other region.12 
Clearly, the delay in concluding the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) of multilateral negotiations drove FTA activity. 
This section does not question choices made by Asian policymakers, or revisit 
arguments on the first- versus second-best ways to liberalize trade. Instead, it 
examines the current situation and asks “where do we go from here, and how 
do we do it?” One could argue there are limited short-run options given this 
current environment. However, there is increasing recognition—even from FTA 
proponents—that the noodle bowl has become convoluted.13 
Two key proposals have been advanced to disentangle the Asian noodle bowl: 
consolidation—which creates a regional FTA to harmonize bilateral FTAs; 
and multilateralization—which grants nondiscriminatory preferences to 
nonmembers, eliminating preference discrepancies.
11 There is no generally accepted definition of Asia. But one used here is the ADB definition.
12 The parties to Asia’s 101st FTA, the Republic of Korea and the United States (US), have 47 FTAs 
between them, 23 of which are in force. This FTA came just 2 weeks after the 100th FTA was 
ratified, between Japan and Peru. Even the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)—a 
relatively poor, landlocked nation of only six million people—is involved in 13 FTAs, 8 of which 
are currently in effect, despite having struggled for more than a decade to meet the requirements 
for accession to the WTO. 
13 Contributing to the administrative complexity of the sheer number of FTAs are the varying rules 
of origin (ROOs), different commencement dates, completion dates, tariff reduction schedules, 
exclusion lists (temporary and general), and any other item up for negotiated liberalization.
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So where do we go from here? The number of FTAs will no doubt increase, given 
the current pipeline and with new proposals still the fastest growing segment. 
A speedy and successful conclusion to global multilateral negotiations would 
likely remove much of the motivation to pursue new FTAs. It may also dilute the 
preferences in many existing FTAs, thereby reducing their impact on trade and 
other flows. But the question remains as to whether a successful conclusion is even 
likely, let alone when. There is also renewed discussion of sectoral agreements 
on trade facilitation and other issues, which may substitute for such a more 
comprehensive multilateral round. The so-called cherry picking approach of 
sectoral agreements appears the most likely way to break the deadlock in moving 
away from the DDA’s demanding all-or-nothing “single undertaking” option. 
In any case, the current state of FTAs suggests that the DDA alone or some 
variant may be insufficient to neutralize today’s highly complex and distorted 
trading environment, and complementary efforts will be required. So, how 
do we do it? Several proposals have been advanced to deal with the noodle 
bowl. These can be broadly grouped into two categories: consolidation and 
multilateralization of preferences. Consolidation involves compressing bilateral 
FTAs into a broader region-wide FTA where intraregional bilateral FTAs become 
redundant. Multilateralization of preferences, or multilateralization for short, 
grants non-discriminatory preferences to nonmembers, eliminating any margin 
of preference (MoP). Of the two approaches, multilateralization would be ideal. 
However, as we have seen in the DDA discussions, there are some very difficult 
issues that will take time to resolve. Yet, there are several interim steps that can 
prepare the groundwork for taking this approach, such as harmonized reduction 
of external tariffs and dilution of rules of origin (ROOs).14 
FTAs in Asia: The State of Play
To set the stage, it is useful to begin by mapping the evolution of FTAs in Asia to 
help describe the current situation. Over the past decade, the number of FTAs 
involving at least one Asian country has more than tripled—from 70 in 2002 
to 257 as of January 2013 (Figure 3). This surge in FTAs has been driven by 
a significant increase in the number proposed or under negotiation. In 2002, a 
quarter of the FTAs in the region were in proposed or negotiation stages. By 
early 2013, that share had increased to almost half the total. Of the 257 FTAs 
announced as of January 2013, 132 have been signed, with 109 already in effect; 
75 are being negotiated, and 50 have been proposed (Figure 4). 
14 These are discussed in further detail in Baldwin (2006, 2008) and Menon (2009).
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In line with the globalizing trend in FTAs, close to three-quarters, or 189 of the 
total, were bilateral FTAs (involving two countries); only 68 were plurilateral 
(involving more than two countries) (Figure 5).  
Within Asia, FTAs involving ASEAN+6 countries—the 10 ASEAN members plus 
Australia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and New Zealand—have increased at an even faster rate than Asia as a 
whole, growing more than six-fold—from 27 in 2002 to 179 in January 2013. To 
date, ASEAN+6 countries account for 70% of the total FTAs in Asia (Figure 6). 
Of the 179 FTAs involving ASEAN+6 countries, the vast majority (130) are 
bilateral. Only a third (42) of these bilateral FTAs involves two ASEAN+6 
countries; the rest are with countries outside the group; 67 of these involve an 
ASEAN+6 country and a trading partner outside Asia (Table 1). The growing 
Figure 3 FTAs by Status—Asia (cumulative, selected years)
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries issue 
a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint study group/joint task force to 
conduct feasibility studies. Framework agreement signed/under negotiation = the 
parties, through relevant ministries, negotiate the contents of a framework agreement 
(FA) that serves as a framework for future negotiations. Under negotiation = the parties, 
through relevant ministries, declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first 
round of negotiations. Signed but not yet in effect = the parties sign the agreement 
after the negotiations have been completed, but agreement has yet to become effective. 
Signed and in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive 
ratification.
Source: ARIC FTA database (as of January 2013), Asian Development Bank.
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importance of non-Asian trading partners is mirrored in the membership of 
plurilateral FTAs (Table 2). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rapid increase in FTAs in Asia has been led by 
Singapore, India, and the large economies of East Asia—the PRC, Japan, and 
Republic of Korea (Figure 7). As of January 2013, Singapore had the most with 
37, of which 18 are currently in effect. India came in second with a total of 34 
FTAs, 13 in effect. The Republic of Korea had a total of 32 FTAs, while the PRC 
and Japan had 27 and 26 FTAs, respectively. Pakistan also had 27 FTAs, 6 in 
effect. Within ASEAN, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia were not far behind 
with 26, 26, and 21 FTAs, respectively. 
Why are FTAs, especially bilateral, so popular?15 An important reason is 
disenchantment with the WTO.
15 See Menon (2007a) for details, and a taxonomy of motivations for pursuing FTAs.
Figure 4 FTA Status—Asia, 2013
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries issue 
a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint study group/joint task force to 
conduct feasibility studies. Framework agreement signed/under negotiation = the 
parties, through relevant ministries, negotiate the contents of a framework agreement 
(FA) that serves as a framework for future negotiations. Under negotiation = the parties, 
through relevant ministries, declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first 
round of negotiations. Signed but not yet in effect = the parties sign the agreement 
after the negotiations have been completed, but agreement has yet to become effective. 
Signed and in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive 
ratification.
Source: ARIC FTA database (as of January 2013), Asian Development Bank.
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Figure 5 FTAs by Scope—Asia (cumulative, selected years)
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: Bilateral refers to a preferential trading arrangement involving only two parties. 
Plurilateral refers to a preferential trading arrangement involving more than two parties. 
Data as of January 2013.
Source: ARIC FTA database, Asian Development Bank.
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Figure 6 FTAs—Asia and ASEAN+6 (cumulative, selected years)
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Data as of January 2013.
Source: ARIC FTA database, Asian Development Bank.
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Table 1 Bilateral FTAs by Geographic Area—Asia, 2013
Bilateral FTAs 2013
Within Sub-region
 Central and West Asia 17
 East Asia 7
 South Asia 8
 Southeast Asia 1
 The Pacific 2
Across Sub-region
 Central and West Asia + South Asia 2
 East Asia + South Asia 4
 East Asia + Southeast Asia 15
 East Asia + The Pacific 8
 Southeast Asia + South Asia 11
 Southeast Asia + The Pacific 7
 The Pacific + South Asia 2
With Non-Asian Countries
 Central and West Asia + Non-Asia 21
 East Asia + Non-Asia 31
 South Asia + Non-Asia 18
 Southeast Asia + Non-Asia 26
 The Pacific + Non-Asia 9
Total 189
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes:
Central and West Asia—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
 Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
East Asia—China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Mongolia; 
 and Taipei,China.
South Asia—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Southeast Asia—Brunei Darrusalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
 Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
The Pacific—Australia; Cook Islands; Fiji Islands; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Federated 
 States of; Nauru; New Zealand; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Timor- 
 Leste; Tonga; Tuvalu; and Vanuatu.
Source: ARIC FTA database (as of January 2013), Asian Development Bank.
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Table 2 Plurilateral FTAs by Geographic Area—Asia, 2013
Plurilateral FTAs 2013
Asian Plurilateral 12
Asian Plurilateral + Asian Country 7
Cross-regional Plurilateral 10
Non-Asian Plurilateral + Asian Country 33
Asian Plurilateral + Non-Asian Plurilateral 2
Cross-regional Plurilateral + Asian Plurilateral 1
Cross-regional Plurilateral + Asian Country 2
Cross-regional Plurilateral + Non-Asian Plurilateral 1
Total 68
FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes:
Asian Plurilateral refers to groupings of more than two countries where all the members are 
Asian countries.
Cross-regional refers to groupins of more than two countries where all the members are a 
combination os Asian and non-Asian countries.
Source: ARIC FTA database (as of January 2013), Asian Development Bank.
The difficulties associated with concluding the DDA have simply reinforced this 
view. Many have pursued FTAs as a means of pressing ahead with their trade and 
liberalization agendas regardless.
FTAs are generally welfare enhancing, with respect to their members at least. 
The extent of the welfare improvement depends on the amount of trade created 
versus trade diverted, which in turn depends on a host of factors—including 
the extent, breadth and speed of the preferential liberalization. There are also 
longer-term dynamic effects that could accrue members through competitive 
and related effects, which are possible but difficult to quantify. FTAs have the 
potential to reach deeper agreements more rapidly on a range of areas—especially 
non-tariff issues—when there are only two or a few negotiating partners 
involved. Preferential accords involving some non-tariff measures—such as in 
services—can be more easily achieved regionally or bilaterally, compared with 
the large numbers at the multilateral level. Reforms in these difficult sectors and 
the more difficult non-tariff barriers have stalled at the multilateral level, and 
some FTAs have been successful in moving these agendas forward. The deep 
integration provisions in the (Republic of) Korea-EU (European Union) FTA 
and the Singapore-US FTA are cases in point. The [Republic of] Korea-US FTA, 
which includes provisions to promote and protect investment, also contains 
Trade Integration and Policy Challenges 
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Figure 7 FTAs by Status—Asia (cumulative, selected years)
FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, FTA = free trade agreement, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Notes: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries issue a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint 
study group/joint task force to conduct feasibility studies. Framework agreement signed/under negotiation = the parties, through relevant 
ministries, negotiate the contents of a framework agreement (FA) that serves as a framework for future negotiations. Under negotiation = the 
parties, through relevant ministries, declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first round of negotiations. Signed but not yet in 
effect = the parties sign the agreement after the negotiations have been completed, but agreement has yet to become effective. Signed and 
in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive ratification.
Source: ARIC FTA database, Asian Development Bank.
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an Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Although the majority of 
FTAs involving at least one Asian economy have remained relatively shallow, the 
potential for deepening over time exists, and increases as the multilateral delay 
continues. These welfare effects are a clear economic motivation to pursue FTAs, 
and arguably their key economic benefit.
There are also non-economic benefits to FTAs. There is no doubt that political 
economy considerations also come into play, as FTAs can promote international 
ties beyond pure economics between a pair or group of countries. Indeed, it is 
often claimed that most—if not all—FTAs have political or strategic motivation. 
The fact that the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 is a recent and 
clear recognition of how a regional cooperation agreement can be more than just 
an economic imperative. Similarly, ASEAN’s success has been on non-economic 
as well as economic fronts. All these suggest that the value of an FTA goes well 
beyond their direct economic impact.
FTAs may also be more politically feasible, as they tend to attract less attention, 
including from media. So the pressure from the political opposition at home 
(such as the anti-free trade lobby or particular “sensitive” industry groups) or 
from abroad (like traditional trade partners or other regional group members) 
will likely be low. This would quicken the speed of negotiation, and thus also the 
number of FTAs concluded.
A snowballing or domino effect has also been driving FTA growth. There 
is clearly momentum driving some of the growth in FTAs with countries not 
wanting to be left out. There are costs of doing nothing in an environment where 
FTAs are proliferating, when access to traditional markets may be affected. More 
than 5 years ago, one study (Baldwin 2008, p. 474) predicted such an effect could 
continue to play a role in the proliferation of FTAs in the region: 
“If history is any guide, the domino effect in East Asia will spread to 
many, many more countries in the neighborhood. In Europe, for example, 
the playing out of several waves of domino effects has left the EU with 
preferential trade deals with every WTO member except nine. It is 
therefore conceivable that the 13 members of the ASEAN+3 group will end 
up signing a very large number of bilaterals in the coming years.” 
These predictions appear to have been confirmed.
The final reason, which favors bilateral over plurilateral FTAs, relates to pure 
possibilities (or the maximum number) that are technically feasible. In theory, 
it is possible to have thousands of bilateral FTAs—many more than plurilateral 
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or one multilateral deal—because only two entities are involved. There are no 
geographical (regional) restrictions on membership. Indeed, any two countries, 
in any part of the world, for any reason, can come together to form a bilateral FTA. 
If “n” represents the number of countries in the world (a number approaching 
200), it is technically possible to have up to (n x n-1) bilateral FTAs, or more than 
18,000 of them. Of course, this does not explain why bilateral FTAs are so popular. 
But they do suggest that, if they are, then they can proliferate dramatically and 
almost uncontrollably.
Despite their immense popularity, and the significant benefits they confer 
to members—both economic and non-economic—FTA negotiations and 
implementation come at a cost. 
The costs of FTAs are increasingly apparent through data on utilization rates of 
preferences, which show many FTAs have yet to significantly impact actual trade 
and other flows. Although there is variation across studies on utilization rates of 
FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia, it is not uncommon to find these as low as 10%–
20%; rarely are they above 30%. However, the most recent enterprise surveys 
conducted by ADB and ADBI in seven countries suggest that utilization rates 
could be improving, as firms become more aware of and familiar with FTAs—
32% of firms in the sample reported that they used FTA preferences for exporting 
goods (Kawai and Wignaraja 2012).  Despite these recent increases, utilization 
rates of one-third or less are low by any standard—including comparisons with 
Europe or North America.16 
How do we explain these low utilization rates? ADB and ADBI surveys show 
that, while lack of information on FTAs was cited as the most significant reason, 
low MoPs and delays or administrative costs associated with ROOs are also 
significant barriers to the wider use of preferences (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011a, 
2011b). Because the cost of complying with ROOs and other requirements are 
perceived to be higher than the expected benefits, importers choose to ignore the 
preferential tariffs and use most favored nation (MFN) rates. One study (Pomfret 
2007) claims that much world trade continues using MFN rates, despite the 
proliferation of FTAs. Needless to say, this dilutes the potential benefits of FTAs. 
Previous FTA assessments have assumed complete utilization of preferences, 
and when more realistic utilization rates are employed, the positive impacts on 
economic welfare are almost equally diminished (Menon 2013a).
Apart from the underutilization of costly FTAs, another potential economic cost 
is greater trade diversion. This is well-known. But perhaps the biggest cost of FTA 
16 To put this in a comparative perspective, utilization rates of below 50% are considered low in 
European preferential trading agreements (see, for instance, Augier, Gasiorek, and Lai-Tong 2005).
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proliferation is its impact on the global trading system. While FTAs can produce 
significant benefits for members, there are harmful spillover effects that cannot be 
ignored. While major trading partners that are excluded may be individually hurt, 
raising the risk of retaliation, the overall trade landscape affecting all countries 
can be hampered as well, more so if the fallacy of composition applies. One study 
(Bhagwati 2008) argues that the system of preferences embedded in bilateral or 
even plurilateral FTAs is destroying the principle of nondiscrimination in trade, 
with FTAs serving as stumbling rather than building blocks. While this remains 
an open question, a key issue facing policymakers in the short- to medium-term 
is “what else can be done?” 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA):  
Compromise or Coma?
The difficulty of agreeing on the DDA’s ambitious program is clear; attention 
has shifted recently toward a compromise involving sectoral deals, including 
one that addresses trade facilitation. 
The heads of all the multilateral development banks recently signed a petition 
promoting sectoral deals (Modern Ghana 2012). Enthused by this prospect, The 
Economist (2012a) has dubbed it the Global Recovery Round.
Concluding sectoral agreements may be one way to break the deadlock and pull 
the DDA out of its long-standing coma. But one concern is that it may actually 
reduce the incentive to conclude a comprehensive multilateral deal. This may 
well be warranted, as sectoral agreements dilute the strength of available trade-
offs, and therefore reduce the ability to strike a bargain among countries with 
disparate interests. Although the multilateral framework remains the best way to 
deal with liberalizing sensitive sectors or difficult issues, this advantage rests on 
one key factor: the ability to trade concessions across a wide range of countries 
with divergent interests. That is the ability to offset the costs to countries of 
conceding protection in sensitive sectors—such as agriculture—against the 
benefits from increased market access in areas where they hold comparative 
advantage: for example, changing rules on investment, intellectual property, 
or services.17 A sectoral agreement may constrain negotiating positions and 
options within the WTO. In the same vein, each time an FTA allows a country to 
17 A potent example was in the lead-up to the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, China in December 
2005. Brazil and India, representing the apparent position of a majority of developing countries, 
proposed opening their markets further to industrial goods and services in exchange for the EU 
and the US dismantling the elaborate system of agricultural support. In the end, it did not happen, 
but for a host of mostly unrelated reasons (see Menon 2007a).
Trade Integration and Policy Challenges 27
bypass this trade-off—simply through its choice of partner—and secure benefits 
without incurring costs, the task of liberalizing sensitive sectors is more difficult. 
The recent announcement to pursue a US-EU FTA highlights how a common 
interest—limiting liberalization in agriculture—can help facilitate an agreement 
(second in size only to that of the DDA), while simultaneously diminish 
prospects of addressing the most distorted sector in world trade. The problem, 
however, is that reaching a bilateral agreement is easier and more practical—with 
unquantifiable gains from a political economy perspective—in comparison with 
concluding a sectoral agreement involving several countries, let alone a multi-
country multi-sector agreement.
Yet, with the likelihood of striking a single deal (like the DDA) already low, the 
benefits derived from successfully concluding a sectoral deal on trade facilitation 
should not be underestimated. Indeed, the benefits would be quite significant, and 
the prospect of concluding one by the time of the WTO Bali Ministerial Meeting 
in December 2013 is a further plus. On average, trade-weighted tariffs account 
for about 5% of trade costs, while logistical and other trade facilitation costs 
are about 10%. The WTO-based trade negotiations aim to bring these logistics 
costs down by half, or to an average of 5%—equivalent to removing all tariffs. 
These potential gains are substantial enough to warrant serious consideration, 
and perhaps counter concerns over the reduced incentives to conclude the more 
elusive, comprehensive deal.
Depending on timing and the form a multilateral deal eventually takes, both the 
need and urgency for other remedies could be reduced, although not removed. 
The longer it takes to conclude a multilateral deal and the weaker any eventual 
deal is, the greater will be the need and urgency for other remedies. If all that 
can be salvaged from the DDA is a sectoral deal, or a few sectoral agreements, 
then restoring order to the multilateral trading system will require a different 
approach. 
Consolidation 
Given the problems posed by FTA proliferation, consolidation involves 
compressing intraregional agreements into a broader regional FTA, making 
those between members of the broader region unnecessary or redundant. 
The consolidation approach has gained ground as a way to disentangle the noodle 
bowl (Brummer 2007; Kawai 2007; and Park and Park 2009). Indeed, there are 
examples of defunct bilateral FTAs after the EU was created that lend credence 
to this approach. For example, the creation of the Central European Free Trade 
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Area (CEFTA) in 2006 successfully subsumed and nullified 32 bilateral FTAs 
involving CEFTA members. Also, the US-Canada FTA was superseded by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If successful, consolidation 
could be considered multilateralizing bilateral accords at the regional level, or 
“regional multilateralization”. In Asia, the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) could pave the way for consolidating ASEAN 
FTAs under a single regional agreement.18 The RCEP will initially include all 
ASEAN+6 members. 
The ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
could pave the way for consolidating ASEAN FTAs under a single regional 
agreement, although it is still too early to tell.
What are the likely welfare impacts of the RCEP? It remains too early to say, 
given that implementation and other pertinent details remain unclear—for 
instance, will the RCEP address existing FTAs between members or serve purely 
as a template for future negotiations? Nevertheless, the analytical framework for 
assessing FTAs and their expansion offers some useful pointers. An expanded 
region-wide FTA would be welfare-improving if it results in substantial terms 
of trade gains, where size matters. If the FTA is large enough, it could lead to 
improving the FTA’s collective terms of trade by reducing imports from and 
export supply to the rest of the world. This implies a substantial amount of trade-
diversion. In this scenario, the welfare gains from improving terms of trade are 
large enough to offset the welfare loss associated with increased trade diversion 
(Menon 2000). 
While this holds for the expanded FTA as a whole; the distribution of gains (or 
even losses for some) among group members may vary significantly. Given that 
ASEAN centrality is often emphasized—and with the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) the only plurilateral FTA involving a subset of RCEP members—the 
distribution issue could be assessed by examining how an expansion could affect 
AFTA. In other words, could an AFTA expansion to the RCEP result in a welfare 
outcome superior compared with the original AFTA? If the AFTA expansion 
results in a substantial amount of trade creation, then this could lead to some 
deterioration in the terms of trade, because part of the resultant increase in real 
incomes is likely to spill over into greater demand for imports from the rest of 
the world. Under this scenario, the welfare loss associated with deteriorating 
terms of trade would have to be smaller than the welfare gains from increased 
18 The ASEAN Framework on the RCEP was formally endorsed at the 19th ASEAN Summit held in 
November 2011, and negotiations kicked off on 20 November 2012, on the sidelines of the East 
Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
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trade creation. In the end, the question on welfare impacts will be determined 
empirically.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the other major preferential initiative 
that involves several RCEP members. 
The TPP does not strictly fit as consolidation. Whereas the RCEP will initially 
involve countries already with existing bilateral FTAs, the network of bilateral 
FTAs between potential members of the TPP is far from complete. Instead, the 
TPP follows an expansion approach—it has an accession clause, and countries 
not involved in the networks of bilateral FTAs among potential members can 
also join the initiative (Hamanaka 2012, Drysdale 2013). The TPP agenda is 
wide-ranging and demanding, much more so than most other high quality FTAs, 
let alone DDA requirements. It is unclear whether many TPP members will be 
able to comply with these stringent requirements. Another challenge involves 
its current limited membership, which excludes major Asian countries such as 
the PRC and the Republic of Korea, although Japan has recently indicated its 
intention to join. A significant increase in Asian membership is needed before 
it can be a serious alternative to the RCEP. Should many Asian economies join, 
and the program comes to fruition without too many exemptions, the welfare 
effects could be significant. But as with the RCEP, the likely impact can only be 
empirically determined—therefore, it is too early to tell.
Despite this, consolidating existing FTAs through the RCEP or TPP expansion 
will likely continue in light of the difficulties in concluding multilateral 
negotiations. However, consolidation comes with its own set of challenges. FTAs 
are a highly heterogeneous group of agreements. They invariably have different 
tariff rates, treatment of quantitative restrictions, sector exemptions (and often 
different “phase-in” rates for each), ROOs that vary by product, and a host of 
other arrangements ranging from some service sector liberalization rules to labor 
and standards provisions. If consolidation moves ahead, the more likely outcome 
is a “race to the bottom” to reach consensus, with the result determined by the 
lowest common denominator, which would likely achieve very little, and could 
even set back reforms in some cases. The recent trend attempting to link regional 
blocs globally could increase the difficulties, as these tie-ups increase both the 
number of members and total diversity, as well as the degree of heterogeneity of 
accords that need to be harmonized.
Even if it were possible to implement a consolidated or expanded regional FTA, 
it would be critical to examine the incentives for policymakers to lobby their 
governments to join. If the provisions in bilateral FTAs are superior to those of 
a regional FTA, then utilization of the consolidated FTA will likely be low. One 
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example is the case of trade involving Sri Lanka and India. The South Asia Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) came into effect in 2006, after a number of intraregional 
bilateral FTAs had been ratified, including an India–Sri Lanka FTA. Like most 
bilateral FTAs, the India–Sri Lanka agreement had better provisions to SAFTA’s 
in almost all respects. As a result, 93% of Sri Lanka’s exports to India currently 
enter duty free under the bilateral FTA (Weerakoon 2008). Thus, rather than 
consolidating and neutralizing the India-Sri Lanka or other bilateral FTAs, 
it appears the use of SAFTA has been quite limited given the existing bilateral 
FTAs. The results of one study (Rodríguez-Delgado 2007) seem to bear this out. 
Using a modified gravity equation, the effects of SAFTA’s Trade Liberalization 
Programme (TLP), which started in 2006, were examined. The results showed that 
SAFTA would have a minor effect on regional trade flows. SAFTA’s TLP would 
affect regional trade flows mainly by increasing India’s exports and imports from 
Bangladesh and Nepal. Of course, it could be argued that this may be a timing 
issue, since full implementation of SAFTA is scheduled for 2016. 
Proponents generally argue that deeper agreements can be achieved more 
rapidly on a range of areas when there are only two, or a few, negotiating partners 
involved. But many of the same proponents also promote FTA consolidation, 
without saying how these wider accords can be agreed to by a much larger 
group of countries. In fact, bilateral FTA consolidation—to create a regional 
agreement—may be more difficult than starting from scratch, particularly where 
potential members do not have any, or only a few, FTAs between themselves. 
While the RCEP holds promise, it is interesting to note that most Asian bilateral 
FTAs are with countries outside the region (see Table 1). Hence, the RCEP will 
likely address roughly a third of all bilateral FTAs, leaving a significant majority 
of FTAs unaffected (Menon 2013b). 
There is also a systemic concern associated with consolidating bilateral FTAs. 
Regional blocs may be seen as fragmenting the world trade system. While RCEP 
may rightly be Asia’s response to the EU and NAFTA—more so now with the 
proposed EU-US FTA—a consolidated Asia-centered FTA may be viewed as 
another major bloc. It is therefore critical to coordinate South-South as well 
as North-South agreements to ensure that regional blocs do not become trade 
fortresses. This was heightened recently with the announcement of EU-US FTA 
negotiations.
If a consolidated FTA is perceived as isolating or discriminatory in any way, 
it could provide fresh impetus for a new wave of bilateral FTAs, as traditional 
trade partners outside the region seek to retain trade access with the newly 
formed FTA. 
Trade Integration and Policy Challenges 31
Perception and reality can vary, but in this context, perceptions may matter 
more in the end. It is quite likely that a new, large, consolidated bloc could be 
seen as threatening traditional non-member trading partners, however open 
the consolidated FTA is designed to be. If this perception holds—with more 
countries outside the region than inside—it is possible that total bilateral FTAs 
could actually increase. This could happen if the reduction in the number of 
intraregional bilateral FTAs through a consolidated FTA is more than offset by 
the number of inter-regional market restoring bilateral FTAs that it indirectly 
induces. This is hardly a remedy to the problems facing Asian economies or the 
world trading system. On the contrary, it could spin more noodles. 
However, like the proliferation of FTAs, consolidation is a recent reality that must 
be addressed. So consolidation should not be seen as an end to itself, but rather 
as a means of preparing the groundwork for greater liberalization in some non-
tariff areas—if it is viewed as part of the journey rather than the destination. 
Multilateralization of Preferences
In remedying the noodle bowl and its distortions, multilateralization can be 
pursued in two ways—moving forward after consolidation, or proceeding 
unilaterally. 
The first follows from the consolidation approach, whereby the harmonized accords 
of the consolidated FTA are offered to nonmembers on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. This would realize the full gains from consolidation, removing the potential 
for trade diversion and the costs associated with implementing ROOs, while 
reducing the risk of a new wave of market restoring FTAs. So once a country 
has concluded FTAs with most, if not all, of its major trading partners, it may 
then make sense to (i) equalize preferences across these FTAs; and (ii) offer them 
to non-FTA countries on an MFN basis. Instead of limiting the harmonized 
procedures to members, as pursued in regional blocs, this approach goes that 
one, critical, step further in multilateralizing them. There are several proponents 
of this approach (for example, Feridhanusetyawan 2005; Baldwin 2006, 2008; and 
Menon 2007b, 2009).
In the discussion on the practicality of consolidating FTAs, the difficulties 
associated with folding multiple, disparate FTAs into one big harmonized one 
were highlighted. But consolidation is not a prerequisite for multilateralization. 
Even without consolidation, or even if an attempt to consolidate fails to work, 
multilateralization can still be pursued unilaterally. Indeed, the need in this 
situation becomes more pressing from a welfare perspective. 
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Multilateralization can proceed from a consolidated regional FTA, or 
economies can seek multilateralization independently; but they both must 
overcome competing interests that lose from the dilution of preferences.
Although all this may be appealing in theory, how realistic is it in practice? There are 
precedents to the voluntary multilateralization of preferential accords. ASEAN’s 
AFTA is a case in point—and the actions of its original members confirm this 
(Feridhanusetyawan 2005, Menon 2007b). When multilateralization is pursued 
in conjunction with aggressive preferential liberalization such as with AFTA, the 
goal of free, nondiscriminatory trade can be reached sooner. To illustrate, trade 
liberalization outcomes under AFTA—with and without multilateralization—
can be portrayed in stylized form (Figure 8). The outcome under a WTO-based 
multilateral deal is also depicted, as a reference point, to identify the goal of free 
and open trade (defined here as 0%–5% average tariff rates). 
How can AFTA be used to move its members toward this ultimate goal? If AFTA 
is implemented on a purely minimalist basis, or without any multilateralization 
of tariff preferences, then the time taken to reach its goal is unchanged. Average 
tariff rates do fall more rapidly however, particularly up to AFTA’s 2003 deadline 
for 0%–5% internal tariff rates, but this gain could be offset by the trade diversion 
Figure 8  The Speed of Tariff Liberalization With and Without 
Multilateralization: AFTA and WTO
AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Area, WTO = World Trade Organization.
Source: Adapted from J. Menon. 2007a. Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? The GMS 
and AFTA in Asia. ASEAN Economic Bulletin. 24(2). pp. 254–266.
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that it would also induce.19 If AFTA expands its membership—or participates in a 
consolidation exercise such as proposed by the RCEP—then the pace of reduction 
increases but the end-point remains unchanged. If, however, members choose 
to multilateralize their preferences soon after AFTA becomes effective, then the 
deadline for free and open trade moves closer to AFTA’s deadline of 2003. In 
reality, the preferences for a majority of tariff lines were fully multilateralized 
before the AFTA deadline. For instance, by 2002 preferences were fully 
multilateralized—or the MoP was zero—for more than half of the tariff lines for 
the original ASEAN members, while more than two-thirds had MoPs of less than 
10% (Feridhanusetyawan 2005). This share continues to increase yearly, although 
admittedly the MoP for a range of sensitive products remains high. If these 
remaining tariff lines are dealt with relatively soon, then the deadline will fall 
somewhere between 2003 and possibly before a multilateral deal is concluded. 
In any case, AFTA has already served as a building block enabling its original 
members to achieve their goal much faster, because of the multilateralization of 
the majority of preferences.
At the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Subic 
Bay in 1996, President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines raised the option of 
multilateralizing the AFTA accords within APEC. At the time, Indonesia had 
already begun providing its AFTA accords to other APEC members. Although 
this proposal was never formally adopted by AFTA, the original members have 
been pursuing multilateralization of their accords as well, not just within APEC, 
but on an MFN basis on a wide range of products. As most trade liberalization 
world-wide has been unilateral, there is a strong basis for optimism in promoting 
this approach. For instance, the World Bank (2005) estimates that—between 
1983 and 2003—unilateral actions comprised the bulk of liberalization, or 65% 
of developing-country tariff reductions (see also ADB 2011). In particular, 
with respect to the original ASEAN members, a highly liberalizing competitive 
unilateralism took place in the 1980s and 1990s to attract FDI from Japan into 
regional production networks (Vezina 2010).
As mentioned, preferential accords in non-tariff areas—such as services—
can be more easily reached regionally or bilaterally when a smaller number of 
participants are involved. If these breakthroughs can be achieved, and if they can 
be harmonized within a consolidated FTA, then implementing multilateralization 
would be easier, and the potential gains much greater. The accords in these areas 
are quite easily multilateralized once they have been negotiated (Lloyd 2002, 
Hoekman and Winters 2007). This is because the instrument of protection in 
many services, for example, is regulation of one form or the other—such as rules 
19 This deadline applies to the original ASEAN members, while the newer member countries have 
been given more time. 
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related to foreign investment, competition policy, or government procurement. 
The same applies to the myriad measures relating to trade facilitation (see 
Hamanaka, Tafgar, and Lazaro 2010 for examples of how trade facilitation 
measures in FTAs can be multilateralized), as well as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical product standards, certification procedures and processes, 
and mutual recognition arrangements relating to professional qualifications. 
These regulations are quite naturally applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion, 
treating domestic and foreign firms equally. This is quite different from tariffs 
affecting trade in goods, where domestic/foreign and intra-foreign discrimination 
is the objective. 
Unlike tariff liberalization, it is often difficult or costly to remove non-tariff 
barriers or measures (NTBs or NTMs) preferentially. It is usually impractical for 
these types of concessions to be exchanged in a discriminatory fashion—once 
an NTB or NTM is removed, the cost of excluding nonmembers will likely be 
high, if not prohibitive, as with most public goods. This difficulty and associated 
cost varies by type of measure. While export subsidies or export licensing, for 
example, could be offered or applied preferentially, production subsidies cannot 
be reduced in the same way. With reducing production subsidies arguably 
the biggest barrier to reforming agricultural trade, this is a major problem 
(Bhagwati 2013).20
In terms of supporting global trade liberalization, the multilateralization process 
fares well. Because preferential tariff reduction schedules are generally quite 
ambitious and rapidly paced, this approach can also accelerate multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
What then stands in the way of pursuing this approach? Clearly the desire to 
secure more reciprocal concessions or market access is a key factor. While the 
benefits from reciprocal liberalization outweigh unilateral actions, the more 
relevant question currently is how much longer should countries wait for 
reciprocity from countries outside any existing FTA, while foregoing the gains 
from multilateralization. Furthermore, the low utilization rates of FTAs in 
Asia also suggest that the benefits expected from reciprocity may be seriously 
overestimated. The potential for trade deflection further erodes expected benefits. 
Given the difficulties of linking mega-blocs together, as noted in a recent editorial 
20 Even if it were possible to exclude third parties, this could seriously derail the reform program. A 
recent study by UNESCAP (2011) notes that preferential treatment negotiated with selected trading 
partners typically involves additional documentation. The study presents evidence of significant 
delays associated with such requirements, as FTAs have adopted different approaches to the rules 
on substantive measures relating to trade facilitation. Moreover, differences in scope, depth, and 
level of detail often translate into varying degrees of administrative inefficiency, through a maze of 
different procedures applied to respective trading partners under different FTAs.
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(The Economist 2012c), the risk is very real. Taken together, there is little basis for 
holding off on multilateralization to try and gain reciprocity in a residual set of 
countries not covered by existing FTAs. There is, however, a greater need to make 
the case for multilateralization more strongly, especially when resistance from 
vested interests and other lobbies can stand in the way (Menon 2013b).
Interim Steps to Multilateralization: Harmonized 
Reduction of MFN Tariffs and Dilution of Rules of Origin 
There are two interim steps that can be used on the way toward 
multilateralization—harmonizing reduction of MFN tariffs; and diluting 
rules of origin (ROOs).
As attempts to multilateralize face resistance, what are the interim steps that can be 
taken to prepare the groundwork for multilateralization? While “pure” unilateral 
actions are commonplace and account for the vast majority of trade liberalization 
observed worldwide, the multilateralization of FTA-based preferences is so 
far much less commonplace. One way forward is to reduce the MoP and the 
distortions it creates by bringing down MFN tariffs themselves. When brought 
down gradually, the MoP is not zero in the interim or at the end, but much smaller. 
This approach may be more realistic when members feel committed to the 
preferential arrangement and therefore prefer a measured approach that retains 
some integrity of the arrangement, especially in the interim. When employing 
this method, an aggressive stance would involve a coordinated approach—such 
as harmonizing MFN tariffs, as with a Customs Union—to the lowest rate in 
the region. This does not require an established Customs Union, however, as in 
the case of Latin American FTAs (Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2007). 
This aggressive approach is preferred, if practicable, in harmonizing MFN tariffs 
through coordinated reduction. 
To some extent, this approach can be considered a mirror to multilateralization, 
only more pragmatic in its gradualism, and with an eventual result that is less 
ambitious (non-zero MoP). It also differs from multilateralization in that it 
applies only to tariffs but not non-tariff measures.
The second possible interim step is the dilution of ROOs through liberalization. 
If FTA members are not yet ready to give up reciprocal preferences, then this 
approach could be seen as preparing the groundwork for that process. It could 
be done through harmonization, and expanding rules of cumulation. If ROOs 
are sufficiently liberalized and rules of cumulation adequately expanded, it 
can remove distortions associated with artificial sourcing of inputs simply to 
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meet regional accumulation requirements. This will reduce the incentive for 
the spoke or peripheral countries to pursue FTAs with either the hub or other 
spokes in order to prevent (non-preferential) spoke-spoke trade being diverted 
to (preferential) hub-spoke trade. The Pan-European Cumulation System (PECs) 
is a good model for how this can work (Gasiorek 2007). 
If rules of cumulation are sufficiently expanded and then harmonized across 
different agreements, complete multilateralization of tariff accords is no longer 
needed. In this sense, liberalizing ROOs, like harmonized reduction of MFN tariffs, 
can be thought of as an alternative means to the same end. Like the harmonized 
reduction approach, it would apply mainly to tariff measures. It should be noted 
however, that the high share of product fragmentation trade—as a result of the 
vertical specialization spread across this region—is likely to limit the extent to 
which a system like PECs could be successfully introduced. Multilateralization, 
when pursued by all members of the consolidated bloc, also delivers reciprocity 
the same way that a consolidated FTA does. This was, after all, the idea behind 
the “open regionalism” approach in the original conception of APEC (Drysdale 
and Patrick 1979, Garnaut and Drysdale 1994). But with multilateralization, the 
possibility of addressing non-tariff barriers and regulatory reforms is enhanced, 
as they are naturally non-excludable once achieved and therefore easier to reach 
when pursued without the constraint of requisite excludability. Therefore, in 
East Asia in particular, dilution of ROOs may still serve mainly as a sequential 
complement that prepares the groundwork—rather than a substitute—for 
multilateralization.
Neither multilateralization nor consolidation—or interim measures—can 
directly result in any change in barriers existing in nonmember countries. 
Barriers facing members in export markets outside the region remain an 
important issue preventing the realization of further welfare gains to all parties. 
A multilateral deal would do this, but, as mentioned, reaching a deal appears 
increasingly remote. In the quest for reciprocity, members of a consolidated bloc 
may wish to pursue tie-ups with other blocs—and this is becoming increasingly 
popular (The Economist 2012c). The recent decision to create the world’s largest 
FTA between the EU and US will increase pressure to pursue such tie-ups, either 
with this mega-FTA or with others around the world.21 Although such tie-ups 
may be inevitable, adding to the benefits members receive, does it become an end 
point in and of itself? 
21 In fact, the EU has been aggressively pursuing FTAs with countries globally, and tie-ups with other 
FTAs. So has the US, although to a lesser extent.
Trade Integration and Policy Challenges 37
As with a consolidated regional FTA, an expanded inter-regional one should 
be viewed as a means rather than an end. Issues relating to trade diversion will 
remain, although they could begin to diminish as the mega-bloc grows, but the 
risk of trade deflection could increase. Concerns over incomplete utilization 
would also remain and significantly erode potential benefits expected on the 
assumption of full utilization. Any expanded FTA would only realize its full 
potential—while removing these risks and the need to implement ROOs—
when preferences are multilateralized. In fact, such tie-ups between large blocs 
should make eventual multilateralization easier, as members would have secured 
preferential access with a larger number of trading partners. In the absence of a 
multilateral deal, multilateralization should still remain the end game.
Comparing the Relative Merits of Consolidation, 
Multilateralization, and the Interim Steps  
to Multilateralization
In disentangling the noodle bowl and promoting liberalization more generally, 
the assessment and likely impact from consolidation, multilateralization, and the 
two interim steps to multilateralization—harmonized reduction of tariffs and 
dilution of ROOs—can be summarized. Again, in stylized form, the likely welfare 
effects of each remedy on a single country relating to its own (import) barriers 
can be portrayed (Figure 9), before considering the benefits and challenges of 
each (Table 3). The stylized framework captures only imports and only tariffs, 
while it is broadly applicable to non-tariff parameters as well.
Two points are worth highlighting. First is the fact that multilateralization 
produces the most significant reduction in distortions and does so in the shortest 
time. It can eliminate not only MoPs, but also some distortions associated with 
discriminatory non-trade restrictions, especially in services. It can achieve this in 
the shortest time because it involves a one-off decision, as opposed to staggered 
(harmonization) or gradual (dilution) changes. 
If multilateralization is the most preferred approach, the least preferred is 
consolidation. Although distortions fall initially, as (some) intraregional FTAs 
are neutralized, they can rise again if (i) a “lowest common denominator” 
outcome prevails, whereby the average level of distortions actually increases; 
and/or (ii) they induce new extra-regional FTAs. If the consolidated FTA is 
perceived as being relatively closed, then it is likely that distortions could increase 
substantially. Even if the consolidated FTA is “open” and is perceived to be so, the 
reduction in distortions is lowest among the four approaches because most FTAs 
involving an Asian country are inter-regional, and these are not addressed using 
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consolidation alone. If the share of intraregional trade involving final goods is 
high, however, consolidation does offer benefits to exporters through increased 
access to each others’ markets. Reciprocal access would offset the welfare losses 
associated with the distortions described above.
These stylized impacts can be better understood by cataloguing the benefits and 
challenges of the different approaches, considering unilateral liberalization for 
completeness (Table 3). It is clear that each has its own strengths and weaknesses, 
with its severity varying by approach. Furthermore, the most beneficial may not 
be politically feasible, however, so trade-offs must be struck.
Summing Up Trade Policy
Although consolidation and multilateralization are not mutually exclusive, 
the former is a means while the latter is an end. While consolidation can assist 
with multilateralization, history shows that unilateral actions—of which 
multilateralization is a special case—are not only feasible but account for 
most trade liberalization.
Figure 9  Stylized Welfare Effects of Different Remedies
FTA = free trade agreement.
A: Distortions (Trade Barriers).
B: Distortions (Trade and Non-Trade Barriers).
Source: J. Menon. 2009. Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements. 
The World Economy. 32(10). pp. 1381–1407.
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Table 3  The Trade Journey—Benefits and Challenges  
of Trade Liberalization
Steps in the 
Sequence of 
Trade Reforms Benefits Challenges
Unilateral 
Liberalization
•	 Maximizes trade creation 
without trade diversion
•	 No need for coordination 
(Note: 65% of developing 
tariff reductions from 
1983–2003 were 
unilateral) 
•	 Lack of reciprocity is 
politically costly
Consolidation •	 Political capital for 
governments and 
policymakers
•	 Higher welfare generally 
assured for members
•	 Potential for long-term 
dynamic partnerships 
by opening up markets, 
providing growth 
opportunities, and 
promoting competition, 
among others 
•	 Potential to achieve 
deeper reforms, because 
of the smaller number 
of economies involved, 
compared with the WTO, 
for instance
•	 Trade diversion (although 
FTAs also create new 
trade) and deflection
•	 Complexity of dealing with 
different ROO
•	 Low utilization rates may 
limit benefits, especially 
given high transaction 
costs in drafting and 
negotiating FTAs; 
•	 Consolidated FTA may not 
negate the use of bilateral 
FTAs if the commitments 
of the latter are superior
•	 Could tax consumers 
and producers if a lower 
cost supplier lies outside 
the region and if trade 
diverted as a result of  
high MoPs
•	 Possible retaliatory  
actions by nonmembers  
if significantly harmed
Harmonized 
Reduction of 
External Barriers
•	 More practical with 
flexible pace of 
implementation 
•	 MoP reduction secured 
indirectly and therefore 
more feasible 
•	 More easily applied to 
tariff than non-tariff 
measures
continued on next page
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The proliferation of FTAs has been greatest in Asia. The noodle bowl—with more 
than 100 FTAs involving at least one Asian economy—is an understandable 
response to the global multilateral impasse. Yet its sheer complexity and diversity 
requires reform. Reviving Doha (the DDA) alone may be insufficient, and the 
prospects for doing so are not high. It is more likely the DDA will be sliced 
into a host of sectoral agreements. Against this backdrop, two key proposals 
have been advanced to disentangle the Asian noodle bowl—consolidation and 
multilateralization. Consolidation builds a regional FTA to harmonize bilateral 
Steps in the 
Sequence of 
Trade Reforms Benefits Challenges
Dilution of Rules 
of Origin (ROOs)
•	 Practical if members 
are unwilling to give up 
reciprocal preferences
•	 Reduces trade diversion 
and the “export of 
protection”
•	 Applies only to tariffs 
and any domestic 
content requirements of 
investment provisions
•	 Less effective in Asia 
(certainly East Asia) 
given the high share of 
production network trade 
and low value-added 
Multilateralization 
of Preferences
•	 Flexible if pursued 
unilaterally, but 
coordinated form delivers 
reciprocity to all parties 
involved
•	 Realizes full gains from 
consolidation
•	 Amenable to building 
block approach, 
although consolidation 
is not prerequisite for 
multilateralization 
•	 Removes potential 
for trade diversion or 
deflection 
•	 Eliminates costs associated 
with implementing ROOs
•	 Reduces/eliminates risk of 
a new wave of market-
restoring FTAs
•	 Time consuming and 
fraught with political 
difficulties if concessions 
or preferences are 
extended to all
•	 A key stumbling block 
is securing reciprocity 
from—and/or market 
access to—third parties 
•	 Liberalizing non-tariff 
barriers is complex, and 
vested interests (such 
as agriculture) prevent 
extending preferences  
to nonmembers 
Table 3 continued
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FTAs—such as the RCEP—while multilateralization grants nondiscriminatory 
preferences to nonmembers, eliminating preference discrepancies. 
These two approaches, however, need not be mutually exclusive. Should 
the consolidation approach result in a regional FTA, it does not preclude 
multilateralization. The preferences of a regional FTA could still be offered to 
outsiders on a nondiscriminatory basis. Indeed, consolidation, if possible, should 
be viewed as a means to an end. However, several questions on consolidation 
remain, such as (i) how multiple bilateral agreements—each with its own defining 
rules and characteristics—can be folded into one agreement without resorting to 
the lowest common denominator to reach consensus; and (ii) how to address 
inter-regional bilateral agreements, which constitute the majority of Asia’s 
FTAs—including RCEP members. The recent trend favoring tie-ups between 
regional blocs could address part of the problem associated with “(ii)”, but may 
exacerbate the difficulties involved with “(i)”, as tie-ups increase both the number 
and diversity of members. Both issues are addressed by multilateralization 
however, whether applied independently or jointly with consolidation. Although 
consolidation requires multilateralization, the reverse is not true. Countries 
are free to pursue multilateralization independently. But they must overcome 
competing interests that lose from the dilution of preferences—usually the same 
interests that favored the FTAs to begin with. 
Because most trade liberalization to date has been unilateral, there is much 
to support this approach. The argument that unilateral actions such as 
multilateralization lack the proper incentives and are therefore impracticable 
ignores the lessons of history. Nonetheless, policymakers handling trade 
in Asia and in other regions continue to face considerable challenges. The 
arguments presented in this special section, which favor multilateralization—or 
consolidation as an interim step—should not be construed as underestimating 
these problems. But the case for multilateralization should be made stronger, and 
pursued more strongly, as the welfare gains will likely be larger. 
Conclusion
This section has examined the key policy issues and challenges facing Asia 
relating to financial and trade integration. Like any policy or strategy, the goal of 
integration must be an improvement in welfare and quality-of-life—both within 
and across countries. Regional integration can expand markets and input sources, 
better allocating resources across the region, thus accelerating economic growth. 
It can also improve risk-sharing. But there are also downside risks, ranging from 
potential contagion to growing income inequality and polarization.
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While the level of Asia’s financial integration may have increased, its benefits in 
terms of consumption and investment risk sharing have been limited. Closer 
economic links helped reduce income disparities across Asia, but inequality 
within countries has risen. Large portions of Asia’s population have not benefited 
from increased prosperity overall. The cascading effect of the ongoing eurozone 
crisis is a vivid reminder of the contagion risk for systems overly integrated and 
where not all pre-conditions are in place.
While collective regional policies have their merit, unilateral policies can benefit 
individual countries and the region; it remains important to use national policies 
to maintain the integrity of domestic institutions. This is ably demonstrated by 
the current complication in Asia’s trade policy landscape, following the plethora 
of FTAs. Indeed, FTA proliferation has been greatest in Asia, where the global 
multilateral impasse has helped create an Asian noodle bowl, with more than 100 
ratified FTAs involving at least one Asian economy.
Two key proposals have been advanced to disentangle the Asian noodle bowl: 
consolidation—which creates a regional FTA to harmonize bilateral FTAs; 
and multilateralization—which grants nondiscriminatory preferences to 
nonmembers, eliminating preference discrepancies.
The ASEAN-led RCEP could pave the way for consolidating ASEAN FTAs under 
a single regional agreement, although it is still too early to tell. Multilateralization 
can proceed from a consolidated regional FTA, or economies can seek 
multilateralization independently; but they both must overcome competing 
interests that lose from the dilution of preferences.
Although consolidation and multilateralization are not mutually exclusive—
consolidation is a means; multilateralization is the end—history shows that 
unilateral actions (of which multilateralization is a special case) are not only 
feasible but account for most trade liberalization to date.
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Regional Cooperation and Integration in a Changing World
Asia is on the rise with increasing significance in the global economy. In parallel, 
regional cooperation and integration is becoming stronger, bringing both benefits 
and costs. The region is diverse, and so are the challenges that must be overcome 
to achieve greater trade and financial integration. For trade, with the Doha Round 
stymied, what is the best route to take in untangling the noodle bowl of FTAs?  
And how best to deepen financial integration? How does integration impact 
inequality—within and across countries? There are risks to integration. How 
should they be addressed? 
This monograph—prepared for the 2013 Asian Development Bank Annual 
Meeting—aims to stimulate debate and further research on the role regional 
integration can play in sustaining growth, reducing poverty, and promoting 
welfare and future prosperity for Asia and the Pacific.
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